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Abstract
This paper examines the African Court of People's and Human
Rights, the historical evolution, criticism, and explores issues that the
Court may deal with as it assumes its new and envisioned role and
form as the Merged Court.
I.

Introduction

The African Union's ("AU") recent adoption of an amended
draft Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and the
African Court of Human and People's Right to the Merged Court and
the addition of a criminal jurisdiction to the Court, have called into
question, the implications on domestic law, the relationship with the
* Professor Shu-Acquaye is a Professor of Law at the Shepard Broad College of Law of
Nova Southeastern University, Fort-Lauderdale, Florida, where she teaches the Business, Commercial, Comparative and International law courses. She would like to thank her research assistant, Mr. Timothy Shields forhis excellent research assistance.
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ICC, and whether the appropriate process was employed.' This is especially true given the speed with which the proposed draft was approved by the ministerial meeting and subsequently recommended to
the African Union for adoption.2 This Paper examines the historical
development of the Court from the African Court of Human and People's Right to the envisaged Merged Court, to show the gains and
losses that the Court experienced leading up to the Merged Court,
and whether lessons learned have been incorporated in the evolving
revised Protocols. Furthermore, this paper examines important issues
like the costs of running the courts, who may have access to the courts,
the State Government's role in fostering the tenets of the Protocols,
conflicting state and regional treatises, and the decision to grant the
Court power over international crimes and the effect that this has on
the International Criminal Court ("ICC"). Further, this paper looks
at the politics of the ICC and the AU by examining the recent cases of
Kenya and Zimbabwe.
II.
A.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights was adopted by the
United Nations General Assembly on December 10, 1948.' This
adoption came at the heels of the end of the Second World War
whereby the United Nations Charter reaffirmed in its preamble. The
preamble provides, "faith in the fundamental human rights, and the
dignity and worth of the human person, in equal rights of men and
women and of all nations large and small." 4 Further, the Universal
Declaration recognizes "the inalienability of the dignity and equality
of the human family as the foundation for freedom, justice and peace
in the world." 5 Consequently, the member states pledged to declare
1. See generally African Commission on Human and People's Rights, Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights, http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/protocolstatute-african-court-justice-and-human-rights-en.pdf (last visited Nov. 13, 2016).
2. Max Du Plessis, Implications of the AU Decision to give the African Court Jurisdiction
over International Crimes, INST. FOR SECURITY STUD. 1 (June 2012), http://issafrica.s3.amazon
aws.com/site/uploads/Paper235-AfricaCourt.pdf. (The draft was prepared in November 2011
and reviewed and adopted in May 2012 in Addis Abba by Ministers of Justice and Attorney
Generals before being subsequently recommended to the African Union Assembly for
adoption).
3. UNITED NATIONS, The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, http://www.un.org/en/
universal-declaration-human-rights/ (last visited Nov. 11, 2016).
4. Id.
5. Id.
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the Universal Declaration as the platform and standard for the
achievement by all people and nations in promoting respect and rights
and freedoms. 6
Unfortunately, during the adoption of the United Nations Charter ("UN Charter") in San Francisco in 1945, only two African countries (Ethiopia and Libya) took part in the conference. 7 In the same
vein, many African countries were colonies or trusteeship territories
under the international trusteeship system whereby the trusteeships
were forced under the UN Charter and in conformity with the UN
Charter and its principles to "accept as a sacred trust the obligation to
promote to the utmost the well-being of the inhabitants of these territories . . ." and also to "promote the political, economic, social and

educational rights.8 The advancement of the inhabitants of the trust
territories, and their progressive development towards self-governance or independence. 9 Although the request for freedom and independence was gaining ground with the African colonies because of the
Declaration of Human Rights, the colonial powers were still reluctant
to allow colonial self-governance, and therefore, degraded the principles of equality and respect for human rights as preserved in the
United Nations Charter.' That is why in the 1960s and later, the
United Nations adopted a number of instruments embodying the principles enunciated under the Universal Declaration of Human rights."
1. Africa's contribution to the evolution of international human
rights law
The independence and democratization for Africans are invariably connected to the realization of human rights.'2 Looking at the
historical development of Africa from the Organization for African
Unity ("OAU") to where it stands today would shed light on the
6. Id.
7. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Dignity and Justice For All Of Us 9 (2007),
http://unpanl.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/cpsi/unpan034007.pdf
8. Id. at 8-9.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id. These include the international Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination, the international Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the 1979 Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women, and the Rights of the
Child were all created as a result of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and prompted
because of the one-time colonies and African States. Id.
12. See generally United Nations, supra note 3.
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evolution of Human Rights, the courts and the present system of Justice as anticipated by the AU as a whole.
a.

The OAU

The OAU was created in 1963 with the intent, among other
things, to "promote unity and solidarity" among African States and to
wipe out the remnants of colonization while it safeguards the "sovereignty and territorial integrity of Member States."' 3 Consequently,
the Organization took various important steps, strategies, and initiatives over the subsequent years that resulted in the establishment of
the African Union in 1999.'"
These initiatives, and others, were the impetus that translated
into the establishment of the African Union when the Assembly of the
AU organized a session to accelerate the "process of economic and
political integration in the continent."' 5 Thereafter, a number of summits were held and which eventually crystalized the formal launching
of the African Union,'1 6 with the ultimate goal of creating "[a]n inte13. Dan Kuwali and Frans Viljoan, Africa and the Responsibility to Protect, Article 4 (h) of
the African Union Constitutive ACT at 14, 16; see Roger Claude Liwanga, From Commitment to
Compliance: Enforceability of Remedial Orders of African Human Rights Bodies, 41 BROOK. J.
OF INT'L L., 1, 104 (2015); see also African Union in Official website available at https://au.int/
utshell.
14. Some of these steps and initiatives include the 1980 Lagos Plan of Action ("LPA"),
which promoted programs and resources for "a self- reliant development and cooperation
among African countries." The African Charter on Human and People's Rights (Nairobi 1981)
and the Grand Bay Declaration and Plan of Action on Human rights: two instruments adopted
by the OAU to promote Human and People's Rights in the Continent. The Human Rights
Charter led to the establishment of the African Human Rights Commission located in Banjul,
The Gambia Africa's Priority Program for Economic recovery ("APPER") -1985; OAU Declaration on the Political and Socio-Economic Situation in Africa and the Fundamental Changes
taking place in the World (1990), which demonstrated Africa's resolve to determine its destiny
and to address the challenges to peace, democracy and security. The 1991 Treaty establishing the
African Economic Community ("AEC") ( commonly known as the Abuja Treaty, which "seeks
to create the AEC through six stages culminating in an African Common Market using the
Regional Economic Communities ("REC") as building blocks"; The Mechanism for Conflict
Prevention, Management and Resolution (1993): a practical expression of the determination of
the African leadership to find solutions to conflicts, promote peace, security and stability in
Africa and the Cairo Agenda for Action (1995), a program for relaunching Africa's political,
economic and social development. African Common Position on Africa's External Debt Crisis
(1997), a strategy for addressing the Continent's External Debt Crisis and The New Partnership
for Africa's Development ("NEPAD"): adopted as a Program of the AU at the Lusaka Summit
(2001).
15. See Liwanga, supra note 13.
16. These submits were: Sirte Extraordinary Session (1999) which decided to establish an
African Union-The Lom6 Summit (2000) adopted the Constitutive Act of the Union.
-The Lusaka Summit (2001) drew the road map for the implementation of the AU
-The Durban Summit (2002) launched the AU and convened the 1st Assembly of the Heads of
States of the African Union.
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grated, prosperous and peaceful Africa, driven by its own citizens and
representing a dynamic force in the global arena."' 7
Notable and practical accomplishments of the OAU include mediation in border disputes between countries within the continent, for
example, the 1963-1964 dispute between Algeria and Morocco, and
the Kenya and Somalia dispute from 1965-1967. i" In the same vein,
the OAU during apartheid, acquiesced to international economic
sanctions imposed on South Africa, should South Africa continue with
the ongoing policy of apartheid. One of the listed initiatives by the
OAU in 1993 for the promotion of peace and security in the continent
was instrumental in the AU's authority to the investigation of the 1994
genocide in Rwanda.' 9
b.

The African Union

The Constitutive Act, which provided for the establishment of the
African Union, was ratified by two-thirds of the OAU's members, and
came into force on May 26, 2001. The African Union replaced the
OAU in July 2002. In envisioning a Union like the European Union,
the African Union was expected to be more economic in nature.20
Some of the organs of the African Union, created to help carry out its
vision of "[a]n integrated, prosperous, and peaceful Africa, driven by
its own citizens and representing a dynamic force in the global
arena, '"21 included the Assembly of the Heads of States,22 AU Com-

17. Liwanga, supra note 13.
18. Kuwali & Viljoen, supra note 13; see also African Union Official Website, supra note 15.
19. Kuwali & Viljoen, supra note 13 at 18; see also African Union, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITAN-

NICA, http://www.britannica.com/topic/African-Union (last visited Jan. 26, 2018).
20. See Profile: African Union, BBC: NEws (Aug 24, 2017), http://www.bbc.com/news/
world-africa-16910745 (The late Muammar Gaddafi of Libya was said to have conceived the idea
of a "United States of Africa," like the European Union).
21. Id.
22. The Assembly is the African Union's (AU's) supreme organ and the Assembly is made
up of the Heads of State and Government from all Member States and therefore a vital organ
that does not only determines its policies but also tracks its implementation and decisions; see
also African Union Official Website, supra note 13.
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mission," financial institutions, Peace and Security Council,2 4 the
Court of Justice, and an all-Africa parliament.2 6
The principal objective of the AU was consistent with the goals,
strategies, and initiatives set out under the OAU and includes amongst
others: 7
* To achieve greater unity and solidarity between the African
countries and the peoples of Africa;
* To defend the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and independence of its Member States;
* To accelerate the political and socioeconomic integration of the
continent;
* To promote and defend African common positions on issues of
interest to the continent and its peoples;
* To encourage international cooperation, taking due account of
the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights;
* To promote peace, security, and stability on the continent;
* To promote democratic principles and institutions, popular participation, and good governance;
* To promote and protect human and peoples' rights in accordance with the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights
and other relevant human rights instruments;
* To coordinate and harmonize the policies between the existing
and future Regional Economic Communities for the gradual attainment of the objectives of the Union;
* To advance the development of the continent by promoting research in all fields, particularly in science and technology;
* To work with relevant international partners in the eradication
of preventable diseases and the promotion of good health on the
continent.
23. The Commission is the principal organ of the AU, and occupied with the day-to-day
management of the Union. Among the many things, it represents the Union and defends its
interests. See African Union Official Website, supra note 13.
24. In 2004, the Peace and Security Council was created and has the authority to intervene
in conflicts as oppose to the AOU old and criticized principle of non-interference in sovereign
nations. Hence, the Council has the power to intervene in for example in cases of Genocide and
crimes against humanity. AU Peace keepers have therefore served in Darfur, Sudan, Somalia
and Burundi, to name a few. See Profile: African Union, supra note 20.
25. See discussions below.
26. Created to ensure the African people participate in governance, development and economic integration of the Continent.
27. AU in a Nutshell, AFR. UNION COMMISSION, https://au.int/en/history/oau-and-au (last
visited Jan. 26, 2018).
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c.

The African Charter.

In 1981, the OAU adopted the African Charter on Human and
People's Rights (the African Charter).28 The OAU also established
the African Commission
on Human and People's Rights (hereinafter
29
"The Commission").
The African Charter on Human and People's Rights came into
force in October 1986. Adding to Europe and the Americas,3" this
regional charter heralded Africa as one of the three major world regions with its own human rights convention. 3' The Charter takes into
consideration a wide array of political, civil, economic and cultural
rights, and the rights of groups and duties for individuals.3 2 In short,
the African Charter is an international human rights instrument that is
intended to promote and protect human rights and basic freedoms in
the African continent.33 In addition, in 1987, the OAU also established the Commission on Human and People's Rights in accordance
34
with Article 30 of the African Charter.
d.

The African Commission on Human and Peoples' Right (The
Commission)

The African Commission is a quasi-judicial body, comprised of 11
members, 35that handles matters arising from the 54 member states in
the continent. It is primarily responsible for the protection of human
rights, the promotion of human rights, and the interpretation of the
African Charter on Peoples and Human Rights. The Commission may
28. Sonya Sceats, Africa's New Human Rights Courts: Whistling in the Wind? 1, 4 (Mar.
2009), CHATHAM HOUSE, http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/public/Re
search/International % 2OLaw/bpo3o9sceats.pdf.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 7 (discussing that the regional human rights systems of Europe and Americas
were established in 1950 and 1948 respectively); Carolina Garcia Hervas, The EuropeanHuman
Rights System, THE HEART OF EUROPE (June 4, 2014), http://theheartofeurope.ideasoneurope.
eu/2014/06/04/the-european-human-rights-system!/; UNITED NATIONS, InternationalNorms and
Standards Relating to Disability: The Regional Human Rights System: The Americas, http://
www.un.org/esa/socdev/enable/comp302.htm (last visited Nov. 11, 2016).
31. Paul J. Magnarella, Achieving Human Rights in Africa: The Challenge for the New Millennium, 4 AFR. STUD. Q., 17, 17 (2000). Many of the African States had already ratified the
United Nations Convention on Civil and political rights and the convention on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights. Id.
32. Id.
33.

AFRICAN COMMISSION ON HUM. & PEOPLES' RTS., African Charteron Human and Peo-

ples' Rights, http://www.achpr.org/instruments/achpr/ (last visited Nov. 11, 2016).
34. Id.
35. Id. Per Article 36, these commissioners serve for a renewable term of 6 years. Members of the commission are elected to serve in their individual capacities Article 32, and therefore, to act independently.
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also consider individual complaints brought before it.36 In addition,
the Commission would deal with any matter that may be entrusted to
it by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government. 7 The Commission reports to the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of
the African Union, formerly the Organization of African Unity. 8 In
order to reach its goals, the Commission is required to "collect documents, undertake studies and researches on African problems in the
field of human and peoples, rights, organize seminars, symposia and
conferences, disseminate information, encourage national and local
institutions concerned with human and peoples' rights and, should
the case arise, give its views or make recommendations to governments." 39
Each state party is required to cooperate with the Commission
and to submit a report (every two years), Additionally, the state party
will explain in the report, the measures the state has taken and plans
to take to ensure its citizens are covered by the rights and freedoms
provided in the charter.40 Apparently, African states have been said to
have not given the commission the required cooperation. 41 States
have failed to meet their reporting obligations, and even when the
Commission has requested information, states have not responded to
the Commission. 42 In other cases, State parties have refused to allow
commissioners on mission to even enter their countries, and the
OAU's inadequate budget to support the Commission has been said
to have contributed to the ineffectiveness of the Commission's
mission.4 3
State parties have refused to allow commissioners on mission to
even enter their countries and the OAU's inadequate budget to support the Commission has been said to have contributed to the ineffectiveness of the Commission's mission. 44 The Commission has been
viewed and called "a toothless bulldog that only barks but cannot
36. OPEN SOC'Y JUSTICE INITIATIVE, Fact Sheets: African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights, (June 2013), https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/fact-sheets/african-commission-human-and-peoples-rights.
37. African Commission on Hum. & Peoples' Rts., supra note 33
38. Id.
39. African Charter, art. 45.
40. Magnerella, supra note 31, at 22.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 22.
44. Id.
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bite. . .. "" The Commission is said to have been more concerned
with involving the States in its work, instead of efficiently exercising
oversight over them in procuring the reports for example.46 Consequently, the failures of the human rights charter and the commission
in achieving its intended human rights goals lead the African leaders
to believe that solving the problems lie in the creation of an African
Court on Human and People's Right. Consequently, in June 1998, the
members of the OAU met in Burkina Faso and voted to begin the
process of creating an African Court on Human and People's Rights.4 7
e.

The African Court of Human & People's Rights

The African Court on Human and People's Rights was established by the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples'
Rights, as part of the African Union.48 The 1998 Protocol to the
Bangui Charter paved the way for the creation of the African Court
on Human and People's Rights ("ACHPR") in 2004. To date, 28
countries have ratified the Protocol for the African Court.4 9 The first
set of judges were installed in 2006.50 On the authority of Article 5,
the Court could entertain petitions from State Parties, NGOs, intergovernmental organizations, and individual citizens regarding the interpretation and the application of the Bangui Charter, as well as any
other human rights treaty as ratified by the State under Article 3."
The Court is to complement the mandate of the African Commission
on Human and People's Rights, and to apply the tenets of the African
Charter on Human and People's Rights, as well as "any other relevant
Human Rights instruments ratified by the State concerned. '5 2 This
provision extended the powers of the Court to incorporate other
45. Timothy Ewa Yerima, Comparative Evaluations of Challenges of African Regional
Human Rights Court, 4 J. POL. & L., 120, 120-28 (2011). This statement is even more significant
given that the decisions of the Commission were not binding on the State parties. Id.
46. Christian-Jr Kabange Nkongolo, The Justiciability of Socio Economic Rights, 22 AFRICAN J. INTERNATIONAL & COMPARATIVE L., 492, 499 (2014).
47. Magnarella, supra note 31, at 23.
48. See Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights, supra
note, 1 at 5.
49. Id.
50. African Court in Brie, AFRICAN COURT ON HUMAN & PEOPLES' RIGHTS, available at
http://www.african-court.org/en/index.php/about-the-court/brief-history
(last visited Mar. 23,
2018).
51. Beth Van Schaak, Immunity before the African Court of Justice & Human & People's
Rights-The Potential Outlier, JUST SECURITY (June 10, 2014), https://www.justsecurity.org/
12732/immunity-african-court-justice-human-peoples-rights-the-potential-outlier/.
52. Magnarella, supra note 31, at 23.
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United Nations Human Rights Conventions ratified by States.5 3
Many African States have ratified such conventions including, but not
limited to, the United Nations Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, the Convention on the Right of the
Child, and many others.5 4 Unfortunately, at the time of ratification,
only two members of the OAU's fifty-one members ratified the Protocol to create the Court.5 5 Between 2008 and 2014, the Court has received only 27 applications.5 6 The Court was operational in 2011, its
seminal year during which at least eleven cases were filed. 57 The
Court received its first application in 2008
in the case of Michelot
58
Yogogombaye v. The Republic of Senegal.
f.

The African Court of Justice

In the same vein, an inter State Court of the African Union, the
African Court of Justice ("ACJ") was created by the Constitutive Act
of the African Union of 2002. 5 ' This was expounded upon in the Protocol of the Court of Justice of the African Union, in 2003, and became effective in 2010.6" However, in 2004 when the 1998 Protocol to
the African Charter, discussed above, became effective, the Assembly
of the Heads of States and Governments began the discussions on the
merger of the two courts-The African court on Human and Peoples
Rights and the African Court of Justice, which should then lead to the
ultimate successor Court-the "Merged" Court.6 ' In a July 2004 decision, the AU Assembly resolved that the future Court on Human and
Peoples' Rights would be integrated with the African Court of Justice.62 The African Court of Justice's role would have been to handle
matters of economic integration and political matters like border
63
disputes .
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 24.
56. Schaak, supra note 51.
57. Don Deya, Is the African Court Worth the Wait?, OPEN Soc'Y INITIATIVE FOR S.AFR. 3
(Mar. 6, 2012) http://www.osisa.org/openspace/regional/african-court-worth-wait.
58. Charles Chernor, International Decision: Michelot Yogogombaye v. The Republic of
Senegal: App. No. 00112008: Judgment, 104 AM. J. of INT'L. 620, 620 (2010).
59. Constitutive Act of the African Union (2002), available at http://www.au.int/en/sites/de
fault/files/ConstitutiveActEN.pdf.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Frans Viljoen, Advancing the Rule and Role of Law in Africa, AFRICLAW (May 2012),
https://africlaw.com/.
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g.

The African Court of Human & People's Right and the African
Court of Justice -The Merged Court

The protocol to this Court (the Merged Protocol) was adopted in
2008, and requires a 15 country ratification to bring it into force.64
The court is to be comprised of two main sections: (1) a general affairs
section which is to deal with interstate matters that was originally intended for the ACJ; and (2) a Human and People's Right section,
which inevitably inherits the role of the African Court on Human and
People's Right, alongside jurisdiction over a number of Human Rights
treaties.65 Further, in 2009, the General Assembly of the Heads of
States and Government of the African Union considered the addition
to the arm of the uniformed African court of Justice and Human
Rights.66 As a result, the Merged Court would also have a section with
the authority to handle criminal matters such as war crimes and crimes
against humanity.67 These discussions were culminated in 2011 with
negotiations, a draft report, and a statute provisionally adopted by the
Ministers of Justice and Attorney Generals.6 8 Logically following this
provisional adoption, in 2012, the draft protocol on the Amendments
to the protocol on the Statute of the merged court was finalized.6 9
Two years later, in May of 2014, the Special Technical Committee
("STC") of the African Union went ahead and adopted the Draft Protocol that included the draft Statute of the ultimate three successor
courts.70 These courts were the African Court of People's and Human
Rights, the African Court of Justice, and the International Criminal
Division. 7' In other words, the proposed court has three major mandates: general affairs, human and people's rights, and international
crimes.12 The full Assembly of the African Union formally endorsed
64. Coalition for an Effective African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights, Ratification
Status: Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights, African Court
Coalition (July 12, 2014), http://www.africancourtcoalition.org/index.php?option=comcontent
&view=article&id=87:ratification-status-proto. Only five states have thus far ratified: (1) Benin,
(2) Burkina Faso, (3) Congo, (4) Brazzaville, (5) Libya, and (6) Mali.
65. Schaack, supra note 51.
66. Id. at 4.
67. Du Plessis, supra note 2, at 4. The Au Assembly requested the AU Commission and the
African Commission on Human and People's Rights examine the implications of the courts being entrusted with power "to try international crimes like genocide, crimes against humanity and
war crimes" and then report to the assembly in 2010.
68. Schaack, supra note 51.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.

2018]

Howard Human & Civil Rights Law Review
this adoption in June 2014, in Equatorial Guinea.7 3 This arguably
means that this new Protocol supersedes the one that merged the African Court of Human and People's Rights and the African Court of
Justice. Therefore, the protocol extends the jurisdiction of the yet to
be established Merged court to crimes under international and transactional crimes. To be effective, at least 15 States ratifications are required for the Protocol and Statute to come into force. 4 Although in
January 2015, the AU Assembly proposed the ratification of the
Malabo Protocol be fast-tracked, only five countries (Kenya, Benin,
Congo Brazzaville, Guinea-Bissau, and Mauritania) had signed the
Protocol, possibly indicating the lack of political will of the States.75
III. SOME ISSUES WITH THE AFRICAN COURTS
(AFRICAN COURT ON HUMAN & PEOPLE'S RIGHT AND
THE AFRICAN COURT OF JUSTICE) TO THE MERGED
COURT 76
A.

Individual v. State Access to the Court

With the adoption of the Charter on Peoples and Human Rights
under the auspices of the OAU in 1986, there was a kind of euphoria
in the African continent as it was an indication that Africa, in emulating the example of the European Human Rights Court and InterAmerican Human Rights, would be a step towards the advancement
to deal with Human Rights issues embedded and plaguing the continent.77 Human rights violations tend to impact mostly individuals in
Africa and, for the most part, these individuals may not be aware of
their rights or the fact that their rights have been violated.78 Even
when they are aware, they would likely want to pursue them in domestic courts mainly through the use of NGOs.7 9 Besides, based on
Article 30 of the 2008 Protocol, direct access to the Human rights institution was available only to State Parties, the Commission, and in-

1.

73. Id.
74. Id.
75. See Protocolon the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights, supra note

76. It is also referred to as the Permanent Court, African Court of Justice and Human
Rights, but I will refer to it as the "Merged Court" in this paper.
77. Yerima, supra note 45, at 123; (This was the author's perception and understanding at
the time.).
78. Id.
79. Id.
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tergovernmental bodies and African Human Rights institutions.8 0
Consequently, it is not common for individuals to have access to the
human rights courts, a situation likely to continue even with the
merged African Court.8 ' Therefore, it is inevitable that as a result,
access to the Merged Court by individuals is likely going to still be a
hurdle as exemplified by some cases. The 2009 well-known and the
first case of the African Court of People & Human Rights, Michelot
Yogogombaye v. The Republic of Senegal, illustrates this difficulty to a
certain extent.8 2 Mr. Hissein Habre was the former Head of State of
Chad and in 2008, had been granted asylum in Senegal since 1990.83
Mr. Habre was suspected of war crimes and acts of torture during his
time in power.8 4 Senegal came under pressure to find a solution to
criminally prosecute Mr. Habre. In 2008, the Parliament of Senegal
adopted a law to permit the retroactive application of its criminal laws
to him. 5 Mr. Michelot Yogogombaye, a Chadian national, submitted
an application to the African Court on Human and People's Rights
(African Court), alleging Senegal was violating not only its own Constitution, but the African Charter on Human and People's Rights
through its intentions to retroactively prosecute Mr. Habre. 6 Mr.
Yogogombaye prayed for a list of 12 actions from the Court, ranging
from a suspension of the actions against Mr. Habre and the establishment of a reconciliation commission for Chad.87
The response filed by Senegal raised several objections, the primary one being that the African Court did not have jurisdiction to
hear the application. 8 Article 5 (3) and Article 34 (6) of the Courts'
Protocol were reviewed by the Court. 9 Article 5 (3) allows the direct
submission of applications by individuals against State parties. 90 But,
80. See Protocolon the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights, supra note
1 (They could only bring such a case if the issue involves a state and the State has officially
accepted the competence of the court as it relates to the matter); see also Yerima, supra note 45,
at 123.
81. Yerima, supra note 45, at 123.
82. See generally Michelot Yogogombaye v. The Republic of Senegal, No. 00112008, Judgment, African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights [Aftr. Ct. H.P.R.] (Dec. 15, 2009), http://
www.african-court.org/en/images/Cases/Judgment/Judgment 0020Appl.001-200800%2OMichelot
2
%20Yogogombaye% 0v% 2OSenegal-%2OEnglish.pdf.
83. Id. at 18.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 19-20.
86. Id. at 20-21.
87. Id. at 23.
88. Id. at 9.
89. Id.
90. Id.
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more troubling for the question of jurisdiction is Article 34 (6), which
states that a State party must have made a declaration accepting the
competence of the Court to receive cases under Article 5 (3).91 Mr.
Yogogombaye had stated in his application, that Senegal had made
such a declaration when the country ratified the Protocol.92 Senegal,
on the other hand, argued no such declaration was made.9 3 The Court
secured a list of State parties who have made Article 5 declarations
from the African Union Commission. 4 After a review of the list, the
Court determined that Senegal, in fact, was not on the list of countries. 95 Consequently, the Court determined it had no jurisdiction to
hear a case brought by an individual under Article 5 (3) against a
country who had not made an Article 34 (6) Declaration, allowing the
Court to hear such applications. 96 This case demonstrates how difficult it is for an individual to bring a human rights violation action to
the court. Assuming a State has standing in bringing an action against
another State, it is very unlikely to effectively do so, and especially
given it is not a common judicial trend in Africa. 97 This is buttressed
by the fact that since the establishment of the African Commission, it
has heard only one case against another state.98
B.

Cooperation of African Governments

African governments should be committed to comply with their
obligations under the African Charter. This means they should seriously undertake their financial obligations, follow the decisions of the
court, and provide their State reports regarding their human rights
undertakings and protections. 99 Most importantly and troubling
would be the needed compliance of States with court rulings to give
the court its effectiveness and integrity. The Court under the African
Rights Court Protocol for example, may address human rights violations by ordering reparation or compensation, as well as employ any
91. Id. at 10.
92. Id. at 5.
93. Id. at 10.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Yerima, supra note 45, at 123.
98. Id.; see also Democratic Republic of Congo v. Burundi, Rwanda & Uganda, Communication 227/99, African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights [Aftr. Comm'n H.P.R.], (May
29, 2003), http://www.achpr.org/files/sessions/33rd/comunications/227.99/227 99 democratic-re
public of congo _burundi-rwanda-uganda.pdf.
99. Yerima, supra note 45, at 126.
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provisional measures in case of emergency, as it may deem appropriate and necessary.'
The conundrum of such enforcement by the
Court is with the fact that the violators of human rights in Africa tend
to be mostly government agents, which makes enforcement of a court
order potentially doubtful.'
As scholar Makau Mutua aptly stated,
"the Modern African State, which in many respects is colonial to its
core, has been such an egregious violator that skepticism about its
ability to create an effective regional human rights is appropriate."'0 2
Accordingly the question looms as to whether the court will be able to
try African Head of States and if the governments will obey court
judgments.0 3 It is therefore quintessential that the Member States be
willing to pursue investigations, conduct trials and enforce judgment.
The case of The Prosecutorv. Omar HassanAhmad Al Bashir of
Sudan is a clear example of how the failure of Member States to cooperate may lead to unenforceable consequences. 10 4 Al Bashir, former
President of Sudan was suspected of crimes against humanity, war,
and genocide allegedly committed in Darfur, Sudan. 10 5 Pursuant to
the Security Council resolution 1564, which established an International Commission to inquire into these alleged crimes in Sudan, determined that indeed crimes against humanity and war crimes were
committed and logically therefore referred the case to the ICC.10 6 Investigations culminated in a warrant of arrest issued by the Pre-Trial
Chamber I in 2009 for Omar Al Bashir for charges of war crimes,
crimes against humanity, and another arrest subsequently extended to
include the charge of genocide in July 2010.07 Surprisingly, and perhaps embarrassingly for both the AU and the ICC, in spite of these
existing arrest warrants, Al Bashir is still at large, even though he has
been traveling freely to several different African countries. The re100. Id. at 123; see Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights,
supra note 1.
101. Id. at 124.
102. Id.
103. Sceats, supra note 28, at 14.
104. Situation in Darfur, Sudan, Int'l Crim. Ct., https://www.icccpi.int/darfur/albashir/Documents/AlBashirEng.pdf.
105. From March 2003 to about July 2008, a protracted armed conflict not of an international
character existed in Darfur between the Government of Sudan ("GoS") and several organized
armed groups, in particular the Sudanese Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A) and the Justice
and Equality Movement (JEM). See Case Information Sheet: Situation in Darfur, Sudan, INT'L
CRIM. CT., https://www.icc-cpi.int/darfur/albashir/Documents/AlBashirEng.pdf
106. Id. Consequently, using its authority under the Rome Statute, the UN Security Council
referred the situation in Darfur, since July 1, 2002, to the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court in March 2005.
107. Id.
2018]

Howard Human & Civil Rights Law Review
fusal of these countries to pay heed to the ICC request has been nothing short of astounding. For example, the Pre-trial Chamber 1
concluded that the Republic of Malawi failed to comply with the cooperation requests issued by the Court with respect to the arrest and
surrender of Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir during his visit on October 2011. The Republic of Chad failed to cooperate with the Court in
the arrest and surrender of Omar Al Bashir during his visit on August
7-8, 2011, and again during his second visit there in February 2013. In
April 2014, the Pre-Trial Chamber II found that the Democratic Republic of the Congo also failed to cooperate with the Court by not
arresting and surrendering Omar Al Bashir to the Court during his
visit to the DRC on February 26-27 2014. In March 2015, the Pre-Trial
Chamber II concluded that Omar Al Bashir's own country, the Republic of Sudan, failed to cooperate with the Court by not arresting
and surrendering him to the Court over the last years; and that in July
2016, the Pre-Trial Chamber II decided that the Republics of Uganda
and Djibouti failed to comply with the request for arrest and surrender of Omar Al Bashir to the ICC.
This failure of the African countries to cooperate with the ICC
has been a topic of debate and criticism. It has even been suggested
that the AU has given a carte blanch to its Member States to ignore or
undermine the ICC. 1°8 This view was heightened by the recent incident in 2015 that took place in South Africa involving, Al Bashir of
the Republic of Sudan. 1°9 Al Bashir, in spite of the arrest warrant,
attended the 2015 African Union talks in South Africa. The issues of
whether he could be arrested per the ICC issued warrants were to be
decided by a South African Court. By the time that ruling was made,
Al Bashir, under the apparent watch of the South African government, had already left South Africa. Needless to say, this sparked tension between the ICC and the South African government, with the
latter attempting to pull out of the ICC."
108. Konstantinos Magliveras, Panelist at the 6th European Conference on African Studies:
Substitutiing International Justice for an African Criminal Justice? (July 8, 2015) (abstract available at http://www.ecas2015.fr/africa-and-international-justice-contestation-resistance-or-sup
port/).
109. 0 Dire Tladi, Interpretation and International Law in South African Courts: The Supreme Court of Appeal and Al-Bashir Saga, 16 AFR. HUM. RTS. J., 310-338, 311-313.
110. President. Zuma's decision to pull out of the ICC was blocked by the country's High
Court as "unconstitutional and invalid" because it was not approved by Parliament. See 0 Dire
Tladi, Interpretation and InternationalLaw in South African Courts: The Supreme Court of Appeal and Al Bashir Saga, 16 AFR. HUM. RTS. J., 310-338, 311-313. (2016); Konstatinos Magliveras, Substituting InternationalCriminalJusticefor African CriminalJustice, 13 (2015); see also
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The underlying question is whether a sitting head of state, wanted
on charges of crimes against humanity, should be held accountable
under international law? Apparently, there should be no claim to immunity by Al Bashir, and that South African diplomats, upon consulting the court before Al Bashir's arrival in South Africa, were
informed of the country's obligation, as a member of the ICC court, to
arrest and hand over Al Bashir."' South Africa, a one-time champion
of the ICC, wants to withdraw from the ICC citing it can no longer
1 12
tolerate the court's denial of immunity to incumbent leaders.
This tense relationship of the African countries and the ICC is
kind of paradoxical, especially given that the African countries initially and overwhelmingly supported the launch of the ICC. Specifically, 34 of the 60 country signatures required for the ICC to be
launched in 2002 were African. The question then is, why this change
of attitude and a failure to cooperate with the ICC? Perhaps it was
reiterated in 2013, at the extraordinary Assembly of the African
Union, where the AU passed the "Decision on Africa's relationship
and the criminal court" attacking the ICC's constant investigation of
African leaders and how that impacts reconciliation." 3 In fact,
Bashir's indictment is said to have been the triggering factor for the
conflict between the AU and the ICC, and consequently dampening
the AU's support for the ICC and African States." 4 This dampening
spirit was confirmed by the swift action of the AU in approving a reso11 5
lution of non-cooperation because of Al Bashir's arrest warrant.

Marlise Simons & Jeffrey Gettleman, InternationalCriminal Court Drops Case Against Kenya's
William Ruto, NY TIMES: AFRICA (Apr. 5, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/06/world/africa/william-ruto-kenya-icc.html.
111. Roger-Claude Liwanga, From Commitment to Compliance: Enforceability of Remedial
Orders of African Human Rights Bodies, 41 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 128-29 (2015).
112. Phillip Apuuli Kasaija, Kenya's Provisional Warrant of Arrest for President Omar Al
Bashir of Republic of Sudan, 12 AFR. HUM. RTS. L.J. 623, 623-640 (2012); see also Ed Cropley,
ICC's Toughest Trial: Africa vs. 'Infamous Caucasian Court', REUTERS: WORLD News (Oct. 28,
2016, 10: 44 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-africa-icc/iccs-toughest-trial-africa-vs-infamous-caucasian-court-idUSKCN12S1U3. The President of Kenya, Uhuru Kenyatta, made history in 2013 as the first sitting head of state to appear before the ICC, on charges of crimes
against humanity. Id.
113. W. Chadwick Austin & Michael Thieme, Is the InternationalCriminal Court Anti African? (Apr. 5, 2016), http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/ 0.1080/10402659.2016.1201952?scroll
=top&needAccess=true.
114. The International Criminal Court and the Politics of Prosecutions, the INTERNATIONAL
JOURNAL OF HUMAN RIGHTS, V. 18, iss 4-5, May 2014 available at. http://www.tandfonline.com/
doi/abs/10.1080/13642987.2014.901310
115. Id.
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C.

Costs of running the Courts

One of the major advantages of having the merged court is that it
minimizes the costs from having to run two courts, the African Court
on Human and People's Rights and the African Court of Justice, and
therefore saves the African Union millions of dollars. The idea of a
merged court was floated by the then President of Nigeria, President
Obasanjo in 2004, who worked to convince the other Heads of States
as to why it will be efficient, cost-wise and resource-wise, especially
given the limited resources of the African Union." 6 However, this
rationale may be undermined by the fact that adding the third division
(criminal division) to the merged court invariably results in even more
costs involved than would be to the African Human Rights Courts.
This fact is buttressed when one looks at the mere U.S. $6 million
budget in 2011 for the African Human Rights Court versus the U.S.
$270 million in the 2006-2007 budget for the International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda." 7 It is argued that the creation of the African
Court should not be a draw back to the existing human rights defenses, and this must be realized whether the merged court is to function independently from a judicial institution devoted to criminal
justice." 8
Perhaps this is why it has been suggested that a provision be
made giving States the choice to accept the jurisdiction of only the
general Affairs Section and Human Rights." 9 Some genuine ques12
tions asked and important to be constantly considered include:
Where will the money to run the court come from? Will international
partners be willing to fund the expansion of the court? Was a cost
evaluation made by the drafters of the protocol? If any, what will be
the likely impact on the work of the African Court?
D.

African Sub-Regional courts and the Decisions of the Courts

Besides the Human Rights Court and the Merged Court, there
exist other established bodies in Africa embodying mandates that handle human rights, such as the Economic Community of West African
116. Viljoen, supra note 63, at 6.
117. Id. Of course, this stark difference in amount in criminal cases explains the obvious
emanating from a trial of a criminal case requiring "extensive fact -finding, presentation of extensive evidence, opportunities to question witnesses, careful assessment of evidence and lengthy
judgements. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. See Duplessis, supra note 2, at 10.
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States ("ECOWAS") Court of Justice. Such courts tend to have conflicting mandates to that of the African Human Rights Court.12' Although ECOWAS's court's jurisdiction is to handle disputed matters
arising under the ECOWAS treaty, it also has the authority to interpret other international human rights treaties including the African
Charter. This right to interpret the human rights treaties is also justified given that State Members of ECOWAS have also acceded to the
African Charter and the African Charter has been incorporated as an
integral part of their different Constitutive Acts. 122 For example, the
preamble to ECOWAS, treaty (as revised) provides for the "respect,
promotion and protection of human rights of the African Charter. "123
This is also reiterated in Article 4 (g) as a fundamental tenet of the
treaty. 124 Thus, ECOWAS could be said to have concurrent jurisdiction with the Human Rights Court that will inevitably extend to the
Merged Court. That is, the African Court and the subsequent Merged
Court would have jurisdiction over any instrument dealing with
human rights, which has been ratified by all the concerned States. 25
This invariably means that such jurisdiction would be exercised over
sub regional courts like ECOWAS. 26 However, there appears to be a
conflict between ECOWAS Court Protocol and the Human Rights
Courts and the Merged Court, in that Article 22 (1) of the ECOWAS
provides that "no dispute regarding interpretation or application of
the provisions of the treaty may be referred to any other form for
settlement except that which is provided by the treaty or this Protocol."'1 27 On the other hand, Articles 3 and 7 of the Human Rights
Court and Article 28 of the Merged Court Statute permits these
Courts to entertain other human rights instruments, with particular
reference to the Protocol of the ECOWAS Court of Justice. 12 Therefore, the Court of Human Rights could technically find itself in a
quandary if it were to claim that it has jurisdiction on a matter brought

121. Yerima, supra note 45, at 124.
122. Id.
123. Id. See Also African Charter on Humans and Peoples' Rights. Pmbl. http://www.human
rights.se/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/African-Charter-on-Human-and-Peoples-Rights.pdf.
124. Id.
125. Yerima, supra note 45, at 124-25.
126. Id. at 125.
127. Id.
128. Id.
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to it concerning the interpretation of Human Rights based on the
ECOWAS Treaty provision.'2 9
In the same vein, and unlike under the Human Rights Court and
the Merged Court, where individuals do not have direct access, under
the additional Protocol to the ECOWAS Treaty, an individual could
bring suit against a State Member. 30 Whether these conflicts could
encourage forum shopping remains to be determined.
E.

Wisdom in establishing the Merged Court?

The wisdom in creating the Merged Court has been challenged.
Some argue that the process by which the Protocol was developed and
drafted was hastily done and consequently did not indulge proper consultation of experts. In February 2010, the African Union began the
process to merge the courts with consultants and by June 2010, they
had already produced a draft Protocol.'
Soon thereafter, the draft
protocol was adopted in June of 2012, by the Ministers of Justice and
Attorney Generals. Consequently, and in realty, the State governments did not really have any meaningful debate or enough time to
study the draft content (only one year). Worse still, non-governmental entities barely had access to the draft document to do so. 13 2 This
undoubtedly leaves behind a sour feeling in these entities and the public as they have simply been excluded from an important matter which
potentially impacts their lives, communities, and countries. Thus, embracing the Merged Court may be difficult for some States as they
may feel they did not have an adequate voice in the process or were
imposed upon. This is, perhaps, one of the reasons why so many States
have not ratified the Protocol.

129. Yerima, supra note 45, at 125. Also, besides Ecowas, there is also the regional court of
the East African Community Court of Justice.
130. Id. at 124. From the African Court of Human & People's Right and the African Court
of Justice and Human Rights, Articles 30(f) and 8(3) requires the court to accept complaints
from individuals and NGOs, but only where the state in question has made a declaration accepting to do so. The NGO will need to be accredited to the African Union before it can submit
complaints to the court.
131. Ghetnet Metiku Woldegiorgis, The African Court of Justice and Human Rights: Pitfalls
in the Protocol on the ACIHR, at 6 (2004).
132. Id.
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F.

Decision of the African Union to Give the African Court
Jurisdiction over International Crimes

As mentioned above, the Merged Court has jurisdiction over
three areas: general affairs, human rights, and international crimes.
The International Criminal Law section will have three Chambers: A
133
Pre-trial Chamber, a Trial Chamber, and an Appellate Chamber.
The Protocol makes expansive extensions of issues relating to international crimes beyond genocides, crimes against humanity, and war
crimes to include unconstitutional change of government, piracy, terrorism and more, it is said to overstretch the court and its resources
and is, therefore, a potential problem for an efficient court operation. 3 What this expanded jurisdiction invariably requires is a "full
complement of staff and institutional resources to ensure justice can
be done to that jurisdiction. . ." and to run international criminal trials. 135 Consequently, "the fiscal implications raise questions about the
effectiveness, independence and impartiality of the court.' 1 36 Also,
the reorganized African Court, with a criminal division, will need the
intuitional facility to protect victims and witnesses and be able to collect and preserve evidence effectively. 137 In following the ICC standards, there needs to be an established defense or legal aid fund to
ensure the impoverished accused have proper representation. 1 38
The ICC provisions may have conflicts with domestic laws, for
example, the elements of a crime under the protocol may be quite
different from the elements under domestic law, which may then force
the African states to re-write their domestic laws. 1 39 In the same vein,
crimes enumerated under the Protocol may be non-existent under the
African domestic laws and, therefore, again cause the African states
to amend their laws or introduce these laws in their domestic laws. 4
One other overly expressed criticism is the relationship between the
African Court of Justice and Human Rights and the ICC; in particular
the relationship of the African leaders to the Rome Statute of the
133. INT'L CRIM. CT, Understanding the International Criminal Court 9, https://www.icccpi.int/iccdocs/pids/publications/uicceng.pdf.
134. Woldegiorgis, supra note 131, at 6-7.
135. Du Plessis, supra note 2, at 9.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 10.
138. Id. The Protocol apparently has this taken care of as it talks in Article 46 M about a
Trust Fund "for the benefit of victims of crimes within the jurisdiction of the court, and the
families of such victims." Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
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ICC.' 4 ' This relationship is important, given that about 43 African
countries are signatories to the Rome Statute, the treaty that established the ICC.'4 2 Surprisingly, the Protocol, itself, is silent about the
ICC, leaving no clear pathway as to how the African States will deal
with the ICC,' 4 3 although the Amended Protocol impliedly refers to it
when it refers to "complementarity with national courts and courts of
regional economic communities."' 4 4 This relationship between the African Union and the ICC was made tense when the ICC referred and
indicted sitting heads of African States, creating hostility among some
African Union Members against the ICC.' 45 This was also compounded by the fact that the African Union advised its States members against cooperating and complying with the ICC.' 46 The Office
of the Prosecutor ("OTP") of the ICC has been criticized as being
biased against African states inappropriately.'4 7 The ICC has mustered its resources to prosecute mostly African cases while undermining violations from "diplomatically, economically, and financially
strong countries" and consequently is said to be applying "selective
justice."' 48 Hence, it is also important that the relationship between
the court and the ICC be clearly defined, especially given that the ICC
seemingly has the authority to entertain cases pertaining to individual
criminal responsibility of African Leaders.' 49 Besides, under the complementarity principle of Article 17 of the Rome Statute, the prosecution of a case by the African court does not necessarily prevent the
ICC from still prosecuting the same case.15 0 To have an effective
symbiotic relationship, the African Court should complement the
work of ICC in a comprehensive manner, but to do so would require
141. Id. at 1.
142. John Mukum Mbaku, InternationalJustice: The internationalCriminalCourt and Africa,
THE BROOKINGS INST., AFR. GROWTH INITIATIVE 9, https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/up
loads/2016/07/03- foresight-international-criminal-court-africa-mbaku- 1.pdf.
143. Du Plessis, supra note 2, at 10.
144. Id.
145. Beth van Schaak, African Heads of State Before the InternationalCriminalCourt, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE TODAY, (June 21, 2015), available at https://www.international-

criminal-justice-today.org/arguendo/african-heads-of-state-before-the-international-criminalcourt/.
146. Mbaku, supra note 142, at 9.
147. Id.
148. Id. The ICC has investigated at least eight incidences involving Africa, including, the
Democratic Republic of Congo, Central African Republic, Uganda , Dafur/Sudan, Kenya,
Libya, Ivory Coast and Mali. See ICC FORUM, IS the InternationalCriminal Court (ICC) Targeting Africa Inappropriately?, http://iccforum.com/africa (last visited Nov. 19, 2016).
149. Mbaku, supra note 142, at 9.
150. Du Plessis, supra note 2, at 10.
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the ICC to restore trust in the African continent by engaging them in
an effective and reconciliatory dialogue.'
Perhaps the appointment
of Fatou Besouda of Gambia, as the Chief Prosecutor of the ICC, may
be a starting point towards amending the strained relationship between Africa and the ICC.'5 2 Looking at some recent issues dealing
with African leaders and the ICC would illuminate the "politics" of
the relationship between these two parties.
G.
i)

The ICC, the AU, and Politics: The recent cases of Kenya and
Zimbabwe
Kenya

In 2008, the ICC started investigations into Kenya's 2008 postelection violence that resulted in 1,300 deaths, others wounded and/or
raped, and with others (about 600,000) forced to flee.' 53 Six individuals were issued summonses and in 2012 charges were ultimately
brought against four of them, including Uhuru Kenyatta and William
Ruto, the now sitting President and Deputy President of Kenya, who
were elected in the 2013 presidential election." 4 The four were
charged with crimes against humanity for apparently having participated in directing and inciting political and ethnic violence,'155 for
which they all denied. In 2015, the case ended in a mistrial as prefaced by the presiding judge, "due to a troubling incidence
of witness
'1 56
interference and intolerable political meddling.'
In the same vein, the prosecution stated that:
[I]ts office had no choice but to suspend the case against President
Uhuru Kenyatta even before the trial began. That case, on charges
similar to those against Mr. Ruto, was hampered because the government was blocking most avenues of investigation and witnesses
were threatened and bribed.' 5 7
151. Mbaku, supra note 142, at 10.
152. Id.
153. Evelyn Asaala, TransitionalJustice in Kenya & the UN Special Rapporteur on Truth and
Justice: Where to From Here, 13 AFR. HUM. RTS.L.J.,
325, 326 (2013); see also Marlise Simons &
Jeffrey Gettleman, InternationalCriminal Court Drops Case Against Kenya's William Ruto, NY
TIMES: AFRICA (Apr. 5, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/06/world/africa/william-ruto-ken
ya-icc.html.
154. Assala, supra note 153, at 345. The case against Mr. Ruto and Mr. Kenyatta was extraordinary given they were both sitting leaders not only facing criminal prosecution, but they
were actually indicted in 2011, which was well in advance of their being elected in 2013.
155. Id.
156. Simmons & Gettleman, supra note 153.
157. Id.

2018]

Howard Human & Civil Rights Law Review
While most of Kenya and perhaps the African Union was jubilating at this decision, the ICC came to grips with the challenge to its
authority.'5 8 Even though the ICC had maintained its credibility by
refusing to bow to Kenyan domestic politics and pressure to dismiss
the charges or the AU's position favoring dismissals & trials,' 5 9 this
decision obviously left no doubts that the Kenyan government vehemently refused to cooperate with the tribunal. It believed the court
was preventing Kenyans' political stability as well as encroaching on
its sovereignty. 60 Without doubt, in September 2013, Kenya's parliament took the step of withdrawing its membership from the ICC jurisdiction. This decision may also strengthen the perception that the ICC
is not "subservient to domestic political interests or in tipping the do'
mestic balance of power." 161
The rulings also undoubtedly demonstrate the frustration of the ICC in obtaining reliable evidence against
high-ranking officials accused of committing atrocities. 6 2 This situation is likely going to remain a prevalent challenge with the AU member countries, especially because the ICC has no enforcement agency
at its disposal.'6 3 The ICC cannot execute arrest warrants, nor gain
access to crime scenes as well as the ability to search official records
64
without the assistance of the national or local authorities.
ii)

Zimbabwe

The recent overthrow of Zimbabwe's president, President Robert
Mugabe, in November 2017, who had been in power since the country
gained independence from the United Kingdom in 1980, has also
sparked questions about the AU and its authoritative policy stance
against tolerance for the unconstitutional change of government by a
coup d'6tat or "out of the barrel of the gun.' ' 1 65 Initially, under the
predecessor organization of the AU, the general policy rule, referred
158. Alana Tiemessen, The InternationalCriminal Court and the Politics of Prosecutions,18
INT'L J. HUM. RTS. 444, 457-58 (2014).

159. Id. at 457.
160. Id.
161. Max Du Plessis, Implications of the AU Decision to give the African Court Jurisdiction
over InternationalCrimes, 235 INST. FOR SECURITY STUD. 1 (June 2012), http://issafrica.s3.ama
zonaws.com/site/uploads/Paper235-AfricaCourt.pdf.
162. See ICC: Kenya Deputy President's Case Ends, HUM. RTS. Watch (Apr. 5, 2016, 3:02
AM), https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/04/05/icc-kenya-deputy-presidents-case-ends.
163. Id.
164. See Roger-Claude Liwanga, From Commitment to Compliance: Enforceability of Remedial Orders of African Human Rights Bodies, 41 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 100, 136 (2015); W. Chadwick Austin & Michael Thieme, Is the InternationalCriminalCourt Anti African? (Apr. 5, 2016).
165. Id.
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to as the capital city rule, simply meant that whoever controlled the
capital city, regardless of how that person acceded to the throne, was
recognized as the sovereign representative by the other governments. 166 Consequently, a spate of a coup d'6tats rocked across the
continent as principles of democracy were not respected or honored
with the ultimate result of civil wars, weak economic growth, and instability. 1 67 Hence, the city capital rule was denounced by the OAU in
2000 under the Lom6 Declaration. 1 68 The Declaration recognized
that the city rule was a great threat to peace and democracy, especially
as prompted by the coups that took place in Burundi and Sierra Leonne in removing duly elected officials from power. 1 69 The OAU's
successor organization, the AU, was quick to embrace this denial of
the city rule and its Constitutive Act made provisions to not recognize
70
governments that accede to power through unconstitutional means.1
The AU, therefore, empowered its Peace and Security Council
("PSC") to monitor, sanction, or suspend any government that carried
out an unconstitutional change of a government. 17 1 In the same vein,
and under Articles 23 and 4 of the 2007 AU African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance, the PSC was granted authority to
monitor incumbent "infringement on the principles of democratic
change of governments."'1 72 The relevance and importance of this declaration was tested publicly in the recent case of Zimbabwe and put
the AU under the microscope as possibly inconsistent with its own
policy rules. Was the overthrow of Mugabe a coup d'6tat, which is
denounced by AU policy? Even if it is not considered a coup d'6tat,
was the seizure of power by the military, as accepted by the AU, a
legitimization of the use of force in politics? In other words, was the
overthrow of President Mugabe through unconstitutional means and
166. Solomon A. Desso, Unconstitutional Changes of Government and Unconstitutional
Practices in Africa, AFR. POL. & AFR. PEACE. 3 (June 2016); see also Philip Roessler & Layla
Ab-Falah, Blurry Lines: The African Union's Imbalanced Regime of Constitutionalism and Its
Consequences, 6 (Oct. 21, 2017); Philip Roessler, How the African Union Got It Wrong, NEW
ZIMBABWE: OPINION (May 05, 2017), http://www.newzimbabwe.com/opinion-40518-How+Afri
can+Union+got+it+wrong+on+Zim/opinion.aspx.
167. Roessler, supra note 166. See Desso supra note 166, at 3 (51% of the successful coup
d'etats out of 169 attempted coups took place in Africa between 1950 and 2010. Between 1952
and 2014, there were 91 successful coups in Africa, and many of them being the predominant
method of political change of power before the 1990's).
168. Id.
169. Id. at 6.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 6, 7. Roessler, supra note 166.
172. Id. at 6.
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therefore should not be recognized? The AU faced this conundrum
but it apparently and tacitly condoned the removal of Mugabe and
ultimately stated that the military intervention was, nevertheless, not a
coup, even though it had initially stated the contrary. The AU has
been criticized for this stance because it was intentionally limited to
the narrow position that an incumbent head of state was removed as a
defining feature of the coup d'6tat as opposed to focusing on "the
unconstitutional use of force to coerce an elected leaders to relinquish
'
power." 173
This stance of not recognizing the overthrow as a coup
that is apparently in support of the Zimbabwe military and its former
Vice President (the coup perpetrators) and who are also now the post
Mugabe government, is in contradiction with the tenets of African
Charter on Democracy, Elections, and Governance.' 7 4
IV.

CONCLUSION

Looking forward, one sees that the Merged Court really exists
only on paper, pending the actual merger of the African Court of Justice and the Court of Human and People's Rights. This also means
the third leg of the three-legged stool, the criminal division within the
Merged Court, has to be created. Likewise, many legal instruments
have yet to be ratified for the court to enter into force. Thus far, only
five countries have actually ratified the treaty to allow for the proposed Merged Court. This in itself is very troubling and leaves one
wondering why the States are reluctant to ratify. Perhaps the African
leader's quid pro quo is based on the search for some immunity for
the African leaders. At the African Union Summit in 2014 in Equatorial, Guinea, the African Union members voted to grant to themselves
(the African Leaders) immunity from the prosecution from the envisaged Merged Court. 1 7 5 Needless to say, there is a general outcry
173. Roessler, supra note 166. (This stance is said to set a dangerous precedent and that it
would have been more rational for the AU's PSC to condemn the de facto coup, and inform
Zimbabwe that it would be thrown out of the AU if the military did not release Mugabe from
under house arrest, and hand over power to a transitional post Mugabe government and disappear from the scene).
174. Ademola Abass, Prosecuting International Crimes in Africa: Rationale, Prospects and
Challenges, EUR. J. INT'L L. 933, 940 (2013); see also Zimbabwe Takeover Seems Like a Coup,
African Union Says, BBC NEWS: AFRICA (Nov. 15, 2017), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-42004816.
175. Beth Van Schaack, Immunity Before the African Court of Justice & Human & Peoples
Rights-The Potential Outlier, JUST SECURITY (July 10, 2014), http://www.justsecurity.org/12732/
immunity-african-court-justice-human-peoples-rights-the-potential-outlier/.
The proposed immunity clause reads: "No charges shall be commenced or continued before the Court against any
serving African Union Head of State or Government, or anybody acting or entitled to act in such
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against the Immunity Clause across the continent and even beyond,
pointing to the fact that the draft protocol was in conflict with the
African Union Constitutive Act.' 76 In particular, the portion that
states the obligation of members is to "[p]romote and protect human
and peoples' rights in accordance with the African Charter on Human
1 77
and People's Rights and other relevant human rights instruments.'
Along with the portion that allows the African Union "to intervene in
a Member State pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of
grave circumstances, namely: war crimes, genocide and crimes against
humanity... "178 The latter is what has plagued the African countries
like Sudan, Ivory Coast, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, and many others. If
the Immunity Clause is effective then the government leaders who
commit or allow such atrocities to take place under their watch, will
not be held accountable. What human rights are then protected under
all these proposed or ratified instruments? Perhaps this may help explain why African Union members have been antagonistic towards the
ICC's work to bring some sitting African Heads of States to justice, by
objecting to jurisdiction over African defendants. 7 9 Perhaps a regional criminal court is the model to follow as in the case of Habre
with the creation of a special court in Senegal. In fact, that case is said
to serve as a model for how the implementation of African solutions
to African problems may be carried out. 80 One thing that is clear is
that the existing Court on Human and People's Rights will simply continue to function until the Merged Court becomes operational.' 8 ' Although Africa has made progress over the years on how to handle
human rights issues, one cannot predict, with certainty, what lies
ahead for the Merged Court. However, hopes and expectations are on
the rise as Africans are scrutinizing the evolution of the regional
Merged Court. Nonetheless, as one scholar stated, "the mere establishment of a Court empowered legally to condemn State Parties for
human rights violations, is no guarantee of success. An effective
capacity, or other senior state officials based on their functions, during their tenure of office."
Id.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id. The president of Kenya, Uhuru Kenyatta and the President of Sudan were being
prosecuted by the ICC for International Crimes, and an AU resolution passed called for "noncooperation by African ICC member states in the arrest of al-Bashir." Id. On the other hand,
Kenyatta spearheaded the efforts to amend a similarly ICC Session of the Assembly of States
Parties in 2013. Id.
180. Id.
181. Deya, supra note 57.
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human rights mechanism requires more."'1 8 2 Consequently, the true
issue is "whether or not the coming into being of the Court will promote or aggravate the situation of human rights on the continent."' 83
Relatively, one cannot help but notice and wonder why more African
countries have ratified the Rome Statute than have been bothered
with the African Court. Should one expect an increase in the number
of African countries seeking to exit the jurisdiction of the ICC? If this
was to happen, it would be troubling for the ICC, which has been
trying hard to counter the allegations of anti-African bias and "neocolonialism." However, one thing is for sure - even when the ICC
admits it is rattled by these potential exits, it is "determined to keep
going, and in particular to counter the allegations of anti-African
bias."'8 4 The issue is whether the AU's somewhat dislikes for the ICC
are some catalysts for strengthening the African Court.

182. Yerima, supra note 45, at 121 (quoting Anne Pieter V.D.M, The New African Court on
Human and Peoples' Rights: Towards an Effective Human Rights ProtectionMechanism for Africa? 18 LEIDEN J. INT'L L. (2005).
183. Woldegiorgis, supra note 131, at 8-9.
184. ICC Debate: Africa vs 'Infamous Caucasian Court'?, AL JAZEERA MEDIA NETWORK:
NEWS (Oct. 28, 2016), http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/10/icc-debate-africa-infamous-cauca
sian-court-161028142708060.html.
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